Russell remarks: "With the possible exception of Leibnitz every philosopher of whom I treat is better known to some others than to me." This afternoon I am surveying more than three centuries of imperial history, and in a field where men of greater distinction than myself have laboured so fruitfully, I am naturally reluctant to claim a Leibnitz. The justification for this extended treatment is not simply that broad interpretations follow the tradition of inaugurals; it is that today we have reached the end of an epoch of empire, which Sir John Laughton, at the beginning of this century, could only dimly visualize.
In the beginning, however, there was little beyond the occasional plundering raid to suggest the coming struggle for empire. For half a century after the first Columbus expedition, no European England and France, and subsequently Holland, could do no more than sketch projects of empire until they were in a position to defend their possessions and secure their communications by sea. Frenchmen or Englishmen might harry the Spaniard or the Portuguese, but to attempt colonization in any but the more remote and less profitable regions of the earth, was to invite disaster.
Yet statesmen in England, as elsewhere, were slow to grasp the importance of controlling maritime communications in the interests of expanding trade and national power. It was difficult to understand that in contrast to warfare on land, superiority at sea could mean not only the conclusive elimination of an enemy, but a practical monopoly of ocean communications. Moreover, until Hawkins set down in impressive memorials the strategic advantages of isolating Spain from her Empire, few Englishmen, if any, believed that the cutting of Spanish sea communications could reduce the military capacity of a great European state. The expeditions of the early Elizabethan sea-dogs were semi-piratical raids, wherein hopes of immediate profit and hatred of Popery counted for far more than any strategical design, such as that of defeating Spain by eliminating her floras. There was no conviction that the ship might be a decisive instrument of national power, or that naval warfare might appreciably affect the result of any European struggle on land.
Nevertheless, national interest was beginning to invade the Atlantic jousting ground. As colonial trade continued to grow, whether in fish or precious metals, jealousy on the part of the "have-nots" inevitably raised the question of exclusive rights. English adventurers, for example, began to prey on Spanish and French shipping to the Newfoundland Banks, and these sporadic And in the building and maintenance of fleets, which alone could secure an empire, British governments were to show greater constancy than did the French simply because they were not handicapped as were the French by the same domestic conflict of interests. It is probably fair to say that a steady concentration on maritime affairs is, or was, only possible in an insular state.
Unlike continental countries such as France or Holland, Britain because of the English Channel could afford to neglect her army and still remain a first-class power. An enemy might threaten communications, or attack an overseas colony, but as long as superiority at sea was maintained the soil of Britain was rarely in danger.
Admittedly the exigencies of domestic politics frequently intruded to the detriment of English imperial objectives. The development of a navy, for instance, was seriously affected by the failure of Charles I to convince his subjects that "ship-money" was more than a shabby political manoeuvre. During the War of the Spanish Succession the struggle between Tories and Whigs became in part a struggle between the maritime and continental interests of the nation. The Jacobites of Hanoverian times, the Cobdenires of Victoria's, or the isolationists of our own day have had to be considered before governments could take decisive action in matters of imperial security.
But these conflicts of interest were merely episodic; they were not, as in France, chronic. The French could not escape the political dilemma which confronted every continental power with a frontage on the Atlantic. The long coastline bordering on two seas did stimulate the maritime and commercial ardour of imaginative ministers; but no French statesman could for long take his eyes from le sol de France. Apart from the danger of enemy coalitions, which a shuffle of the diplomatic cards might provoke at any time, the age-old rivalry of Bourbon and Hapsburg drew like a magnet on the arms of France, making maritime ambition a thing of intermittent enthusiasms. France wanted continental power and security, and she wanted an overseas empire, but even her great resources were not sufficient to achieve both. With the exception of the War of American Independence, when a continental coalition gave her temporary superiority, she had to count on losing the war at sea; and it is hardly surprising that both the Seven Years' War and the Napoleonic Wars were, as contests for overseas empire, very one-sided struggles.
On the other hand, it must be remembered that as long as
France could win victories on the Continent, retain a hold on the Low Countries, or occupy Hanover, she could always enter the market of peace negotiations with valuable bargaining counters. What was lost by defeat on the high seas, might be retrieved at the peace table. British ministers were very much aware of this constant factor in peace negotiations; it was not only the needs of home security that prompted Britain's search for allies on the Continent, and costly expenditures on field forces to support these allies.
Indeed, when effective allies were lacking, as during the War of the Austrian Succession, Britain was forced to launch emergency expeditions against French possessions overseas. These expeditions were essentially last-minute diplomatic efforts; they were intended to win bargaining pawns which might be used to balance The Second British Empire of 1815 was founded, therefore, on a unique naval predominance that had been shaken only during the War of American Independence. By emphatically establishing her maritime ascendancy over her rivals along the western seaboard of Europe, Britain had been able to ensure a relatively unrestricted freedom to pursue trade and garner strategic possessions all over the world. Before 1815 the Royal Navy was the determining force in the establishment of the Empire; after 1815 and until the dissolution of Pax Britannica in the twentieth century, the Royal Navy was the guarantee of its security and further expansion.
In the nineteenth century this Empire was not only worldwide; it was scattered and therefore it was vulnerable. Yet, allowing for minor lapses, Britain could safely guarantee to defend colonial trade and territories anywhere. By the beginning of the twentieth century, however, she was no longer able to maintain by herself this two-hemisphere insurance. With the rise of Japanese and American naval power, the English Channel ceased to be the focal centre for commanding the seas; and to safeguard the United Kingdom in view of mounting German ambitions, the principle of universal command had to Today, however, the sea is no longer the only condition of such unity. The aeroplane is rapidly taking us back to the world of Ptolemy, to a small and shrunken world, not of oceans containing huge island continents, but of great stretches of land divided by gigantic lakes. Today, as Sir Halford Mackinder once predicted, Europe, Asia, and Africa are becoming one continent, and the unity of the land has become the vital element in what is termed "global strategy."
In the past, a nation that held command of the surface of the sea could not avoid becoming a great imperial power. Indeed, the pieces that make up the incongruous mosaic called the British Commonwealth and Empire were as often the fortuitous products of naval supremacy as the consequences of deliberate national policy. Even at the end of the nineteenth century, Admiral Mahan could reasonably assert that command of the sea was identical with world power. Today, however, imperial dominance based on 
